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The New Laws That Will Enable Electronic
Contracting: A Survey of the Electronic Contracting
Rules in the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
and the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act
Mary Jo Howard Dively*
INTRODUCTION: FOUR HYPOTHETICALS

A purchasing agent for a national building contractor wants to
save time and money by contracting over the Internet for the
company's requirementsfor nails and other fasteners. She enters
into an electronic contract with the Internet vendor to supply the
company's requirementsfor three years.
An entrepreneur sets up a website to match job seekers with

companies seeking their services. Using Internet technology, all of
the necessary 'paperwork" can now be done electronically,
resulting in significant savings and time-until the entrepreneur
discovers that certain disclosures required under the federal Fair
Credit Reporting Act cannot be validly made electronically.

A consumer attempts to download new software from the
vendor's website. During the downloading process, there is a small
hyperlink notice titled "Legal terms and conditions: Please read."

The consumer, eager to get the software, decides to finish
downloading and then go back and read the legal terms and
conditions. When she returns to find the link, however, it is gone.
When she receives the bill for the software she ordered, she sees
that she has been charged for eleven copies, not one, and realizes
that she must have pressed the "1" key twice by mistake when
* The author is a shareholder in the Pittsburgh office of Klett Rooney Lieber & Schorling,
a Professional Corporation. She is the co-chair of the American Bar Association Section of
Business Law Subcommittee on Information Contracting and served as the ABA Section of
Business Law Advisor to the UCITA Drafting Committee. Ms. Dively co-chairs her Firm's
Technology Law Group, and regularly represents both large-and emerging technology and
Internet companies, as well as traditional companies that are facing the myriad challenges of
adapting their businesses to ecommerce. She received her B.A. and B.S. Degrees from the
University of Kansas in 1980, and her J.D. degree from the Vanderbilt University School of
Law in 1983.
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ordering.
A company emails a software manufacturer about acquiring a
new business application. The manufacturer responds with its
standard terms and conditions by email, and the company emails
back its order, substituting its standard terms and conditionsfor
those submitted by the manufacturer. The manufacturer emails
back a response stating that it will not ship unless its terms are
accepted by the buyer. The company emails back rejecting this
proposal, but there is an Internet glitch that day, the email never
makes it to the manufacturer,and the manufacturerships.
As recently as a few years ago, the transactions described in the
foregoing examples would have been rare. Today, they are staples
of the practice of law in electronic commerce. They also are
replete with legal issues that cannot be resolved with certainty
under existing law.' To the contrary, notwithstanding the
widespread faith in the Internet's promise to make commerce more
efficient and less expensive, electronic contracting under current
law is filled with uncertainty. Unless these uncertainties are
resolved, the promise of the Internet is likely to be at least stunted
and at most, dramatically lessened, as more contracting disputes
rise to the level of actual litigation. 2 Furthermore, the issues raised
are important enough to deserve the consideration of varying policy
choices that inform all good lawmaking, rather than allowing the
market essentially to make the law. Fortunately, two new uniform
acts have arrived to bring legal certainty and clarity just in time to
answer the explosion of electronic commerce. They are the
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act ("UETA7) and the Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act ("UCITA'). 3 This Article will
1. All of the referenced examples were drawn from the author's practice during the
past year. Following is a brief list of the most obvious concerns raised in these
hypotheticals: In the first example, under current law it is doubtful that an electronic
contract for a term of three years would satisfy the statute of frauds. The second example
illustrates the frustration of having to satisfy many different laws, some of which have been
updated to allow for electronic contracting, and some of which have not. The third and
fourth examples describe various traps for the unwary and other procedural pitfalls faced by
the lawyer attempting to prepare enforceable electronic contracting procedures.
2. Thus far, much of the Internet-related litigation has addressed broader themes, such
as privacy and constitutional issues. Garden-variety contract disputes with an Internet twist
will not be far behind as business becomes more comfortable with electronic contracting.
3. UETA is sponsored by the American Law Institute ("AU") and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL"). It was approved by both
bodies at their respective annual meetings in 1999. NCCUSL is a national, nonprofit
organization whose members are practicing attorneys, law professors, and judges appointed
to represent each state. UCITA is sponsored by NCCUSL and was approved by it .at its
annual meeting in 1999. Revised Article 2 is sponsored by the ALI and NCCUSL and is
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examine the approach of each to the challenges posed by
electronic contracting, noting the differences in scope and policy
4
choices in each Act.
I.

THE ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING RULES OF THE UNIFORM ELECTRONIC

TRANSACTIONS ACT

UETA makes electronic transactions legally equivalent to paper
ones. Its drafting process began in the shadow of federal electronic
transactions legislation that was being considered simultaneously in
Committees of the United States House of Representatives and the
United States Senate. The concern that uniform state electronic
transactions legislation would be preempted by federal action
informed the UETA Drafting Committee
throughout its
deliberations.5 Whether this spurred the UETA Drafting Committee
to work in a super-efficient fashion is not known, but what is clear
is that they produced a remarkably clear and focused statute in
under three years. They did so by understanding at the outset what
was most important: to produce an understandable statute that
accomplished the basic objective and avoided controversy so that it
could be enacted swiftly in the states. They did not try to rewrite
substantive law. That was left to other drafting committees. 6 As
noted by UETA's Reporter, Professor Benjamin F Beard, at the
outset of the UETA project:
At its most basic, this policy focuses on overcoming perceived
bias against electronic records and signatures because of their
ethereal nature and lack of concrete substance. The concern
in this regard relates to the sense that something as seemingly
fleeting as electronic "beeps and chirps" is insufficient to
support and evidence commercial
activities involving
potentially large sums of money. Whether the concern
anticipated to be approved by both bodies at their annual meetings in 2000. Following
approval by the sponsoring bodies, each Uniform Act is then presented to the states for
adoption. As of March 2000, UETA had been adopted in two states, California and
Pennsylvania, and was on the legislative list in ten others; and UCITA had been adopted in
one state, Virginia, and was on the legislative list in five others.
4. This article is not a comprehensive review of all laws applicable to Internet
transactions; it focuses on UCITA and UETA, which will provide the basic transactional law
that governs these transactions.
5. See Reports of UETA Drafting Committee Meetings, found at <http:/!
www.webcom.com/legaled/ETAForuim>.
6. The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act and the revisions to Uniform
Commercial Code Article 2 (currently ongoing) were the principal efforts aimed at
addressing similar issues simultaneously.
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manifests itself in the context of existing writing and signature
requirements such as the Statute of Frauds, or evidentiary
requirements to prove the existence and terms of a
transaction, the concerns are real for many. Notwithstanding
these concerns, however, the economic benefits of electronic
commercial activity, e.g., time, efficiency and storage savings,
have caused many commercial actors to proceed with
implementing electronic commerce in the face of these
concerns. This is largely due to the recognition among
commercial actors that electronic .commerce is generally as
reliable and safe as paper, and justifies the risks inherent in
the legal uncertainty.7
The Drafting Committee recognized that existing substantive laws
would be, in most cases, adequate to deal with electronic
transactions if only the public could overcome its distrust of the
media by which these transactions were implemented. Electronic
records and signatures were not in 1997 widely thought to be as
trustworthy as paper writings and inked signatures.8 Indeed, based
on the reaction of certain state legislatures to initial attempts to
enact UETA in 1999 and early 2000, there still remains a bias
against electronic media.9 Still, the Drafting Committee's decision to
focus its efforts on the procedure by which an electronic
transaction is conducted rather than trying to create new
substantive contracting rules for those transactions was wise.
Eventually, the bias will go away, as more and more people
participate in electronic transactions and become comfortable with
the media. As that happens, it also will become clear to the
majority of people, as it was to the members of the UETA Drafting
Committee, that most substantive laws can be applied to electronic
transactions with satisfactory results. 10
Take, for example, a document that is commonly thought to
require, without exception, a paper writing and an inked signature:
the deed to transfer real estate. In fact, the reason that a paper
writing and inked signature are thought to be necessary probably
has more to do with the filing requirements of local recorders of
7. U.E.T.A. Reporter's Memorandum, August 15, 1997.
8. See id.
9. See Patricia Brumfield Fry, Impressions and Comments on California's
Non-Uniform Changes to Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, ELEc. L Comm. REP. (BNA
1999). and testimony before the Ohio House Financial Institutions Subcommittee on House
Bill 488 (the Ohio version of UETA).
10. See U.E.T.A, Prefatory Notes at page 9 (1999).

2000

Survey of UETA and UCITA

deeds than with any actual unreliability of the electronic form. If,
as in some states, the recorder is willing to accept for filing an
electronic deed with electronic signatures, why shouldn't parties
avail themselves of the efficiency and economies of the electronic
form? Some might argue that the requirement for notarization
precludes the ability to transfer real estate with electronic deeds,
but if the notary has the means to verify that an electronic
signature is that of the party it purports to be from and if an
adequate electronic substitute can be found for the notarial seal
(some exist today), then why should a paper notarization be
required? The UETA Drafting Conmiittee realized that in order for
UETA to be truly effective, it had to lead people beyond artificial
biases to a place where electronic and paper transactions could be
compared, and recognized as legally equivalent."
A.

What Does UETA Cover?

UETA succeeds, not by creating new substantive rules for
electronic contracting, but by validating the use of electronic
media. In order to understand how it works, the reader must start
with an understanding of its scope. UETA applies to electronic
4
records 2 and electronic signatures 13 that relate to any transaction.
Beyond this basic scope, there is an additional test which must be
met in order to determine whether UETA applies to a transaction:
UETA expressly states that it applies to a transaction only where
each party has agreed to conduct the transaction electronically. 5
Thus, it can be characterized as an "opt-in" statute, rather than a
statute which requires
parties to
conduct
transactions
electronically. This agreement may be determined from the context
and surrounding circumstances, including the conduct of the
11. Drafting Committee Meeting Report, October 9-11, 1998, available at The ETA
Forum, a website devoted to UETA, found at <http://www.webcom.com/legaled/ETAForunm>.
12. UETA defines "electronic record" to mean "a record created, generated,
communicated, received or stored by electronic means," and defines "record" to mean
"information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or
other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form." U.E.T.A. § 2 (1999).
13. UETA defines "electronic signature" to mean an "electronic sound, symbol or
process attached to or logically associated with a record and executed or adopted by a
person with the intent to sign the record." See id. The definition of electronic signature does
not require the person giving the electronic signature to intend to identify himself or to be
bound by any specific terms. See id., cmat. 7.
14. UETA defines "transaction" to mean "an action or set or actions occurring between
two or more persons relating to the conduct of business, commercial, or governmental
affairs." See id.
15. See U.E.T.A. § 5(b).
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parties.16
The Drafting Committee recognized that the requirement for such
an agreement, though one of the building blocks of UETA which
reassures members of the public that they will not be forced into
electronic transactions against their will or unwittingly, also could
create uncertainty as to the procedures which must be used to
obtain such agreement. 7 It could provide an open invitation to
parties who desire later to avoid the effect of their electronic
contracts by asserting that they had not really agreed to conduct a
transaction electronically. Clearly, it imposes an additional
requirement for the enforcement of electronic transactions,
something the UETA Drafting Comnuttee generally tried to avoid. A
plaintiff seeking enforcement of its electronic transaction would
have to prove first that the parties agreed to conduct the
transaction electronically before getting to the proof of the
substance of the transaction. Proof that a party "agreed" to conduct
the transaction electronically may not be easy. Prudent parties may
wish to add an extra step to their electronic contracting processes
which confirms that the parties agree to conduct the transaction
electronically and companies attempting to move their customers
from paper-based transactions to electronic ones are advised to do
so very carefully. 8 Further, it is possible that some parties,
particularly consumers, might be able to argue with some success
that unless they were presented with the opportunity to do
business other than electronically, they really did not "agree" to do
business electronically but instead were forced to do so, and thus
should be able to avoid UETA. While such uncertainly is likely to
diminish as more people enter into electronic transactions, it exists
today, and it is difficult to predict how courts will rule in these
cases.19
16. See id.
17. See U.E.T.A. § 5, cmts. 2-4 (1999).
18. It likely will not be sufficient, for example, to bury in the back of the boilerplate of
a standard form a sentence stating that the relationship of the parties may be converted to
an electronic basis at any time by the creator of the standard form. Pennsylvania included in
its version of UETA a non-uniform provision which requires, for transactions with
consumers, that such a provision to be separately signed by the consumer so that there is no
chance that the consumer will not understand that, even though he is signing a paper
document, the transaction might later be converted to an electronic one.
19. The Official Comments to Section 5 recognize and deal with these concerns to a
great extent. They state:
If this Act is to serve to facilitate electronic transactions, it must be applicable under
circumstances not rising to a full fledged contract to use electronics. While absolute
certainty can be accomplished by obtaining an explicit contract before relying on
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Though the scope of UETA is broad, there are several areas
which are expressly excluded from coverage by UETA: (a) wills,
codicils, and testamentary trusts; (b) transactions covered by the
Uniform Commercial Code (other than Sections 1-107 and 1-206,
Article 2, and Article 2A) including Articles 3, 4, 4A, 5, 6, 7, 8, or
9;20 (c) transactions covered by UCITA; 21 and (d) transactions
governed by other laws identified by each State. 22 These exclusions
were developed following extensive investigation and Report dated
September 21, 1998 by the Task Force on State Law Exclusions. 23
electronic transactions, such an explicit contract should not be necessary before one
may feel safe in conducting transactions electronically. Indeed, such a requirement
would itself be an unreasonable barrier to electronic commerce, at odds with the
fundamental purpose of this Act. Accordingly, the requisite agreement, express or
implied, must be determined from all available circumstances and evidence.
Subsection (b) provides that the Act applies to transactions in which the parties have
agreed to conduct the transaction electronically. In this context, it is essential that the
parties actions and words be broadly construed in determining whether the requisite
agreement exists. Accordingly, the Act expressly provides that the party's agreement is
to be found from all circumstances, including the parties' conduct. The critical
element is the intent of a party to conduct a transaction electronically.
U.E.T.A. § 5, cmts. (1999). The Official Comments to Section 5 provide several helpful
illustrations of circumstances from which it may be found that parties have or have not
reached agreement to conduct transactions electronically. These deal with matters as diverse
as whether an email address on a business card enables the recipient to infer that the giver
of the business card has agreed to communicate electronically (the Comments suggest the
answer is "yes", but probably not for matters beyond the scope of the business indicated by
the card) to whether a buyer who executes a seller's standard form paper contract which
has buried in the fine print an agreement for the buyer to receive all notices electronically
has really agreed to accept such notices electronically (the Comments suggest the buyer has
not, unless there are other indicia of the buyer's willingness to do so). See U.E.T.A. § 5, cmts.
20. The various named articles of the UCC each contain electronic rules which are
appropriate to their respective subject matter, and thus UETA is not needed to cover such
subject matter.
21. Like the named articles of the UCC, UCITA contains electronic contracting rules
which are appropriate to its subject matter, and thus UETA is not needed to cover such
subject matter. Until UCITA passes in a state, however, UETA, if passed in that state, will
apply to transactions in the subject matter covered by UCITA.
22. UETA defines "State" to mean a State of the United States, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular
possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The term includes an Indian tribe
or band, or Alaskan native village, which is recognized by federal law or formally
acknowledged by a State. See U.E.T.A. § 2.
23. Available at <http://www.webcom.comlegaled/ETAForum>. Prior to the work of the
Task Force, it had been widely thought that the list of exclusions from UETA's scope would
be longer. Upon review of the Report, however, the Drafting Committee concluded that no
exclusions other than those that presently appear in UETA were warranted. The Drafting
Committee recognized, however, that state legislatures working their way through enactment
of UETA might be less comfortable about including certain categories of documents in
UETA, and provided in the Comments a Legislative Note with an extensive discussion of
'both the Task Force's findings and the Drafting Committee's reaction thereto regarding
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B. Now That We Know What UETA Covers, What Does It Do?
UETA states that records or signatures may not be denied legal
effect merely because they are in electronic form, and that
contracts may not be denied legal effect merely because an
electronic record was used in the contract formation. 24
Furthermore, UETA states that if a law requires a record to be in
writing or requires a signature, an electronic record or signature
25
satisfies that requirement.
These are the core provisions of UETA, and will be the basis for
legal validation of millions of electronic transactions once UETA is
fully enacted. It is important to note that the latter provision is
intended to provide only that electronic records and signatures
should not be treated differently than written records and manual
signatures and not to provide that transactions using such
electronic records or signatures are automatically enforceable. For
example, a business may properly use an electronic signature in
accepting an offer to supply goods, but whether or not a legally
enforceable contract is formed depends on the compliance with the
contract formation rules under the UCC, UCITA or other applicable
law.
C. Does UETA Contain Any Substantive Rules?
1.

Section Eight

UETA contains a few substantive rules. The most important of
these are found in Section Eight. Subsection (a) of that Section
provides that if parties have agreed to conduct a transaction
electronically and a party is required by another law (such as a
consumer protection law) to provide the other party with
information in writing, the law is satisfied if the information is
provided electronically as long as it is capable of being retained
by the recipient when the information is received. This
requirement may be problematic in that there are many real world
situations in which such information is not given in a form capable
of being retained, and also because it is not clear exactly what are
the obligations of the sender to assure that a recipient can retain
specific areas of potential exclusion or special treatment. Among the areas treated are trusts
(other than testamentary trusts), powers of attorney, real estate documentation, and
consumer protection requirements.
24. See U.E.T.A. § 7.
25. See id.
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the information.
UETA tries to be somewhat helpful on the latter point, putting in
a reverse safe harbor of sorts which states that an electronic
record is not capable of retention by the recipient if the sender or
its information processing system inhibits the ability of the
recipient to print or store the electronic record. UETA does not
state, however, when information will be deemed capable of
retention, or how long it must be capable of retention. Is it the'
recipient's obligation to print out the information at the time of the
transaction, or must the sender keep the information available for
subsequent electronic reference by the recipient? These are
significant concerns for any entity that does substantial electronic
business with consumers (who are most likely to be covered by
such laws). The Official Comment to this section brings little clarity
to the issue, stating that:
3. Under subsection (a) to meet a requirement of other law
that information be provided in writing, the recipient of an
electronic record of the information must be able to get to the
electronic record and read it, and must have the ability to get
back to the information in some way at a later date.
Accordingly, the section requires that the electronic record be
capable of retention for later review. The section specifically
provides that any inhibition on retention imposed by the
sender or the sender's system will preclude satisfaction of this
section because electronic information may be given to a
person in a manner which prevents the person from retaining
a copy of the information. The policies underlying laws
requiring the provision of information in writing warrant the
imposition of an additional burden on the sender to make the
information available in a manner which will permit
subsequent reference. A difficulty does exist for senders of
information because of the disparate systems of their
recipients and the capabilities of those systems. Certainly,
where the sender or sender's system imposes an inhibition on
retention by the recipient, this section has not been satisfied.
It is left for the courts to determine whether the sender has
complied with this section if evidence demonstrates that it is
the recipient's system which precludes subsequent reference to
the information.
In particular, the Official Comments' emphasis on the recipient
being able to make "subsequent reference to the information" is
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quite troubling, as it may be interpreted to suggest that senders are
required to preserve such information electronically for an
unlimited time and permit recipients to return to it. This is
inconsistent with commercial practice, and would be both
expensive and an administrative nightmare for senders.
Even if a business can figure out how to satisfy this requirement
technically, some forms of business simply do not provide
information in a form capable of being retained. An example would
be certain airport kiosks that permit a user to purchase an
electronic ticket, or accomplish some other electronic transaction.
Another example, though not covered by UETA's scope, might be
the notice on a proprietary ATM that advises an individual of a
$1.00 charge for non-bank customers and requests that requires
that individual to press "I Agree" in order to continue with the
transaction. Banks are required by law to provide these notices in
writing and to obtain agreement to the extra charge. Would such
notices fail to satisfy the retention requirement unless the machines
are reconfigured to provide a printout that an individual may
retain? A better approach might have been one which, absent the
capability of retention, would permit a presumption if a security
procedure demonstrated that the information was provided, and
that the individual pressed the "I Agree" button. Such an approach,
while preferable from a commercial standpoint, would not have
been as reassuring to the majority of people as an outright
retention requirement, because it would not have guaranteed to
recipients that they would be able subsequently to verify the terms
26
to which they had agreed.
The Drafting Committee's approach in this subsection is
consistent with its guiding principle to produce a statute that was
readily enactable and non-controversial, particularly for consumers.
They took an important step to satisfy the business "senders" by
providing that laws which require records to be "in writing" would
be satisfied by an electronic record, but then protected consumers
(and avoided a potential challenge by consumer representatives and
state attorneys general) by providing that, in cases covered by the
laws as stated above, the electronic record must be capable of
retention by the recipient.
Section Eight contains two other important substantive rules.
26. A common complaint of consumers using the Internet to license software, for
example, is that once they click "I Agree" upon reading the software license, they often
cannot find the license again. It "disappears."
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The first of these states that if a law other than UETA requires a
record to be posted or displayed in a certain manner, to be sent,
communicated, or transmitted by a specified method or to contain
information that is formatted in a certain manner, then the record
must be posted or displayed in the manner specified in the other
law, and except as limited by Section Eight, must be sent by the
method required by the other law, and must contain the
information formatted in the manner specified in the other law.
Inasmuch as the most likely "other" laws to be involved will be
consumer protection laws, this section makes it clear that a state's
consumer protection laws will trump UETA in almost all cases.
This requirements of Section Eight may not be varied by agreement
of the parties except to the extent permitted by the other law, but
since many such laws will be consumer protection statutes, it is
likely that most will not permit waiver of the writing requirement.
The last of the substantive rules in Section Eight is found in
subsection (c), which specifically states that if a sender inhibits the
ability of a recipient to store or print an electronic record, the
electronic record is not enforceable against the recipient. This is
contrasted from the rule in subsection (a), which deals with the
27
provision of information in writing.
2. Attribution of Electronic Records
The next set of substantive rules are found in Section Nine and
deal with attribution. UETA provides that an electronic record or
electronic signature is attributable to a person if it actually was
"the act of the person."28 For example, if an officer of a company
types her name on a purchase order (or if her employee does so on
her authority or if her computer does so after being programmed to
do so), then the electronic record and the electronic signature
would be attributable to her.29 Whether an electronic record or
signature was actually an act of the person may be proved in any
manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security
procedure-however, UETA does not provide examples or any
meaningful guidance as to what is considered an effective security
30
procedure.
27. See U.E.T.A. § 8, cmt. 4.
28. See U.E.T.A. § 9.
29. See id.
30. UETA broadly defines "security procedure" as 'a procedure employed for the
purpose of verifying that an electronic signature, record or performance is that of a specific
person or for detecting changes or errors in the information in an electronic record. UETA
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UETA falls short, in this regard, of what would be really helpful
for commercial transactions in electronic commerce. Proving that
an electronic act was actually the act of a person can be complex.
It might require the testimony of a number of parties (and many
more where the electronic transaction goes through the Internet).
In some cases, it simply may not be cost-effective to undertake the
proof. As discussed below, prior versions of UCITA recognized this
and attempted to deal with it through a series of presumptions
granted after both parties agree to use a commercially reasonable
security procedure. The effect of such presumptions would have
been to make such proof routine, while providing an opportunity
for rebuttal in those cases where the electronic act really was not
the act of the person. More importantly, requiring a commercially
reasonable security procedure :would have acted as an effective
check on unscrupulous parties in a way that silence on the issue
does not. Litigation costs would have been reduced and frivolous
attempts of remorseful parties to later avoid being bound would
have been chilled.
The Drafting Committee considered whether presumptions
should be included in UETA several times throughout its drafting
process. Its decision not to include them, while not the most
helpful for transactions between commercial parties, likely will
make UETA less threatening to consumers, and thus is consistent
with the overall tone of the statute to welcome new parties to
electronic commerce. Pennsylvania, in enacting its version of
UETA, reexamined this issue and decided to make presumptions
available for non-consumer transactions. 31 These provisions state:
ATTRIBUTION OF RECORDS AND SIGNATURES
Section 701. Use of security procedures.
If there is a security procedure between the parties with
respect to the electronic signature or electronic record, the
following rules apply:
(1)

The effect of compliance with a security procedure

also provides that the term includes a procedure that requires the use of algorithms or other
codes, identifying words or numbers, encryption, or callback or other acknowledgment
procedures. See U.E.T.A. § 2.
31. See Pennsylvania Electronic Transactions Act, Chapter 7.
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established by a law or regulation is determined by that
law or regulation.
(2) In all other cases, if the parties agree to use or
otherwise knowingly adopt a security procedure to verify
the person from which an electronic signature or
electronic record has been sent, the electronic signature
or electronic record is attributable to the person
identified by the security procedure if the person relying
on the attribution satisfies the burden of establishing
that:
(i) the security procedure was
reasonable;

commercially

(ii) the party accepted or relied on the electronic
message in good faith and in compliance with the
security procedure and any additional agreement
with or separate instructions of the other party;
and
(iii) the security procedure indicated that the
electronic message was from the person to which
attributionis sought.
(3) If the electronic signature or electronic record is not
attributable to a person under section 305 but would be
attributable to the person under this section, the
electronic signature or electronic record is nevertheless
not attributable to the person under this section if the
person satisfies the burden of establishing that the
electronic signature or electronic record was caused
directly or indirectly by a person:
(i) that was not entrusted at any time with the
Tight or duty to act for the person with respect to
such electronic signature or electronic record or
security procedure;
(ii) that lawfully obtained access to transmitting
facilities of the person if such access facilitated the
misuse of the security procedure; or
(iii) that obtained, from a source controlled by the
person, information facilitating misuse of the
security procedure.
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Section 702. Effect of using security procedure to detect
errors or changes.
If the parties use a commercially reasonable security
procedure to detect errors or changes with respect to an
electronic signature or electronic record, the following rules
shall apply:
(1) The effect of a security procedure is determined by
the agreement between the parties or, in the absence of
agreement, by this section or any law establishing the
security procedure.
(2) Unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, if a
security procedure indicates that an electronic signature
or electronic record has not been altered since a
particulartime, it is treated as not having been altered
since that time.
Section 703. Commercial reasonableness.
The efficacy and commercial reasonableness of a security
procedure is to be determined by the court. In making this
determination, the following rules apply:
(1) A security procedure established by statute or
regulation is effective for transactions covered by the
statute or regulation.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (1),
commercial reasonableness and effectiveness
is
determined in light of the purposes of the security
procedure and the commercial circumstances at the time
the parties agree to or adopt the procedure.
Section 704. Inapplicability to consumers.
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any
electronic transaction to which a consumer is a party.
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Section 705. Variation by agreement.
Except as otherwise provided by statute or regulation, any
provision of this chapter other than section 704 may be
varied by agreement.

The availability of these rules for commercial parties, coupled
with their lack of availability in consumer transactions, should
make Pennsylvania at the same time the most welcoming for
commercial electronic commerce, and the safest for consumer
32
electronic commerce.
D. Errors in Electronic Records
In the event of a mistake in electronic contracting (for example,
an individual accidentally orders 10,000 sweaters instead of 1,
UETA includes provisions addressing changes or errors in
electronic transmissions.3 Under UETA,
if a change or error occurs in transmission of an electronic
record, and if the parties agreed to a security procedure to
detect changes or errors and one party did not use the
security procedure (where using the procedure would have
caught the error or change), then the effect of the change or
error may be avoided by the party who did conform to the
security procedure. 4
If a change or error occurs in an automated transaction involving
an individual and an electronic agent/machine and the individual
can avoid the effect of an electronic record that resulted from an
error made by the individual in dealing with an electronic agent if
the electronic agent did not provide the individual with an
opportunity to correct or prevent the error, provided that the
individual promptly notifies the other party that it does not intend
to be bound, takes reasonable steps to return the consideration
received from the other party, and not use or receive any benefit
35
from the consideration.
32.
UETA.
33.
34.
35.

Ohio as of this writing has included similar attribution provisions in its version of
See U.E.T.A. § 10.
See U.E.T.A. § 10(1).
See U.E.T.A. § 10(2).
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Automated Transactions

Recognizing that many contracts may be formed through the
interaction of machines, UETA provides basic contract formation
rules for automated transactions, 36 providing that a "contract may
be formed by the interaction of electronic agents (i.e., machines) of
the parties even if no individual was aware of the electronic agents'
actions or the resulting terms."7 This provision allows contracts to
be formed by machines, inferring the requisite intent to contract
from the programming and use of the machines by individuals. 38
UETA also provides that "a contract my be formed by the
interaction of an electronic agent and an individual if the individual
performs actions that it is free to refuse to perform and which it
knows or has reason to know will cause the electronic agent to
complete the transaction or performance." 39 "It is important to note
that the terms of the contract are determined by the substantive
law applicable to it."4°
Taken collectively, the minimalist rules of UETA provide a useful
framework to welcome parties to electronic commerce, while not
frightening them with more aggressive rules that are becoming the
norm in commercial transactions, or burdening them with
substantive rules that are better left to the substantive law that
.governs the subject matter of their transaction. A discussion of
such a substantive law follows.

11.

THE ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING RULES OF THE UNIFORM COMPUTER
INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT

UCITA is a substantive contract law statute that develops a legal
framework for computer information transactions that is similar to
the framework established for sales of goods under Uniform
Commercial Code Article 2. Like Article 2, all but a handful of
UCITA's rules are default rules, meaning that they apply only when
the parties have not otherwise agreed, and they can be varied by
the parties' agreement. Most of the policy choices made by the
36. UETA defines "automated transaction" to mean a transaction conducted or
performed, in whole or in part, by electronic means or electronic record, in which the acts
or records of one or both parties are not reviewed by an individual in the ordinary course of
forming a contract, performing under an existing contract, or fulfilling an obligation required
by the transaction. Id. § 2.
37. See U.E.T.A. § 14 (1).
38. See U.E.T.A. § 14.
39. See U.E.T.A. § 14 (2).
40. See U.E.T.A. § 14 (3).
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UCITA Drafting Committee are similar to the policy choices made
in current Article 2.
UCITA contains a progressive package of substantive electronic
contracting rules that are designed to clarify many of the questions
about electronic contracting that have arisen in the past few years.
Indeed, one of the basic themes of UCITA is that a substantive
framework for Internet contracting is needed to facilitate
commerce in computer information. 41 It is important at this point to
distinguish between UETA and UCITA. As noted in the Reporter's
Prefatory Notes to UCITA:
The advent of the Internet as a commercial information
resource has highlighted the importance of "electronic
commerce", including electronic contracting issues. UCITA has
been one source of principles for development of state law
rules on contract aspects of electronic commerce. These rules
are coordinated with the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act.
However, they go beyond the purely procedural rules in that
Act and provide a general contract law framework for
electronic transactions involving computer information, where
42
a contract can be formed and performed electronically.
In its development of appropriate electronic contracting rules,
the UCITA Drafting Committee addressed three overarching issues:
(i) that in order for electronic contracts to be validly made,
electronic records and signatures must be equivalent to paper
records and pen and ink signatures; (ii) that there must be
substantive rules about how an electronic contract may be formed,
and how the terms thereof are established; and (iii) that in order to
provide greater legal certainty (in conjunction with factual
certainty) to electronic transactions, appropriate rules on
attribution of electronic messages are needed. The Draft of UCITA
which was presented to NCCUSL for approval broke important
legal ground in all three areas; unfortunately due to a number of
circumstances that will be discussed herein, some of these
provisions narrowly missed approval by NCCUSL.
41. See Prefatory Note to NCCUSL Annual Meeting Draft of UCITA by the Reporter,
Professor Raymond Nimmer.
42.

See id.
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What Does UCITA Cover?

A lengthy discussion of the scope of UCITA is not the subject of
this article;3 however, it is necessary to discuss UCITAs scope
briefly in order to inform the reader's understanding of the
electronic contracting provisions of UCITA. Though a much more
extensive and substantive statute than UETA, UCITAs scope is
limited to "computer information transactions." 44 A computer
information transaction is defined as an agreement a primary
purpose of which is to require a party to create, modify, transfer,
or license computer information or informational rights in
computer information. "Computer information" is information in
electronic form that is obtained from or through the use of a
computer or that is in digital or equivalent form capable of being
processed by a computer. The term includes a copy of information
in that form and any documentation or packaging associated with
the copy. Therefore, UCITA applies to, among other things,
contracts for the licensing or purchase of software, contracts for
software development, and contracts for access to databases
through the Internet.
UCITA is limited by the definitions of "computer information"
and "computer information transaction," which do not encompass
things like sales or leases of goods, computers, televisions, VCRs,
print books or other publications, or services contracts (except
computer support and/or development agreements). 45 Generally,
goods remain subject to UCC Article 2 or Article 2A.
Aside from those areas that do not fit into the definitions of
"computer information" or "computer information transaction,"
UCITA expressly states that it does not apply to (a) financial
services transactions; 46 (b) motion pictures or audio or visual
43. See Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., Uniform Rules for Internet Information Transactions:An
Overview of Proposed UCITA, 38 DUQ. L REV 319 (2000).
44. See U.C.I.T.k § 103(a).
45. See U.C.I.T.A. § 103, cmts.
46. "Financial services transaction" means a contract or a transaction that provides
access to, use, transfer, clearance, settlement, or processing of:
(A) deposits, loans, funds, or monetary value represented in electronic form and
stored or capable of storage electronically and retrievable and transferable
electronically, or other right to payment to or from a person;
(B) an instrument or other item;
(C) a payment order, credit card transaction, debit card transaction, or a funds
transfer, automated clearing house transfer, or similar wholesale or retail transfer of
funds;
(D) a letter of credit, document of title, financial asset, investment property, or similar
asset held in a fiduciary or agency capacity; or
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programming, other than in (i) a mass-market transaction or (ii) a
submission of an idea or information or release of informational
rights that may result in making a motion picture or a similar
information product; or sound recordings, musical works, or
phonorecords, or an enhanced sound recording, other than in the
submission of an idea or information or release of informational
rights that may result in the creation of such material or a similar
information product; (c) compulsory licenses; (d) employment
contracts; (e) contracts that do not require that information be
furnished as computer information or in which the form of the
information as computer information is otherwise significant with
respect to the primary subject matter of the transaction; or (f)
subject
matter within the scope of UCC Articles 3, 4, 4A, 5, 6, 7, or
47
8.

Understanding UCITAs scope also requires the reader to
understand how UCITA handles mixed transactions. In modem
commerce, virtually all transactions are governed by multiple
sources of contract law (e.g., Uniform Commercial Code, statutory
consumer law, common law as reflected in cases). In such "mixed
transactions," the issue to be resolved is: When two (or more)
different sources of law provide conflicting results, how are each
applied to the transaction?
With respect to UCITA, the main area in which the mixed
transaction issue arises involves the sale of goods along with
computer information (for example, the purchase of a computer
with pre-loaded software). Usually, UCC Article 2 applies to the
goods, but UCITA governs the "computer information" provides
rules dictating the extent to which UCITA will apply where other
laws are implicated. For example, in transactions involving (a)
computer information and goods (which are covered by Article 2);
or (b) computer information and subject matter that is governed by
other articles of the UCC, UCITA adopts a modified "gravamen of
the action" standard, meaning that the specific rules of each article
will apply to the subject matter of each article, with certain
exceptions.
The first exception is that UCITA, not Article 2, applies to goods
that are merely a copy, documentation, or packaging of computer
information covered by UCITA (for example, a computer tape or
(E) related identifying, verifying,
information.
See U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(30)(A-E).
47. See U.C.I.T.A. § 103.

access-enabling,

authorizing,

or

monitoring
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diskette).
The second exception is that if computer information is so
embedded in and sold or leased as part of the goods that the
computer information is merely incidental to the goods, then
UCITA applies to the copy of the computer information (a) if the
goods in which the computer information is embedded are a
computer or a computer peripheral; or (b) if giving the purchaser
access to the functional attributes of the software is a material
purpose of the transaction. With respect to determining materiality,
the Comments to UCITA Section 103 provide that factors to be
considered are the extent to which the computer program is the
focus and appeal of the product and the extent to which the
computer program is subject to separate negotiations. To illustrate,
examples provided in the Comments indicate that UCITA would not
apply a computer program which operates the brake system in an
automobile, where the functionality of the automobile was the
focus, but would apply to contracts for the development for or
supply of the computer program to a manufacturer.
UCITA further provides that in transactions involving computer
information and other subject matter that is governed by other
articles of the UCC, those other articles will control the aspects of
the transaction applicable to their own subject matter.
With respect to transactions involving computer information and
other subject matter that is not governed by the UCC, courts will
follow general interpretation principles to determine the extent of
UCITA's applicability. Generally, courts will apply a modified form
of the "predominant purpose" test. If computer information is the
predominant purpose of the transaction, then UCITA rules will
apply to the entire transaction instead of other law (except, of
course, as limited by the exclusions from UCITA). The comments
to UCITA Section 103 provide a number of examples of the results
which would be achieved in applying the predominant purpose test
in a number of fairly common mixed transactions involving
non-UCC subject matter. In this regard, the comments specifically
note that decisions under prior law that held that a contract for
software development was covered by Article 2 when the only
"good" involved was the diskette on which the software was
delivered, and the rest of the performance of the contract required
development services, did not achieve the right result.
Like the UCC, UCITA is premised on freedom of contract. As a
general rule, parties to a contract have the right to choose the law
which will govern their transaction. UCITA does not preclude such
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right, but does provide guidelines on opting in or out of UCITA. For
example, subject to certain restrictions, if a transaction includes
computer information, parties may by agreement provide that all or
part of UCITA governs the transaction in whole or in part ("opting
in"), or that other law governs the transaction in whole or in part
("opting out").4
In order to safeguard certain parties, however, opting in or
opting out is subject to the following restrictions: (a) an agreement
to opt out does not alter the applicability of the defense in Section
118 (a consumer defense for electronic error) or the limitations in
Section 816 (relating to electronic self help), nor, in mass market
transactions, the applicability of unconscionability, fundamental
public policy or good faith; (b) the basic theme is that full opt out
ordinarily should be enforced by the courts and the interests of the
parties are properly safeguarded under the other law (UCC or
common law) as a whole. The matters described in (a) above are
so fundamental that their variance should not be permitted; and (c)
an agreement to opt in does not alter the applicability of any
otherwise applicable law that may not be varied by agreement; and
in a mass market transaction does not alter the applicability of
consumer protection law, or a law applicable to a tangible copy of
information in print form.49
The opt-in and opt-out provisions of UCITA reflect a compromise
position for many industries that did not want to be unintentionally
dragged into UCITA; however, neither did they want to be kept out
in matters where they might find it useful to be in. Thus, the opt-in,
opt-out provision was born to accommodate the needs of those
parties. If their transactions involve information, they may choose
or not choose UCITA. In order to protect consumers, parties are
not permitted to use the opt-in and opt-out provisions in a manner
which would harm consumers.
B. What Are UCITA's Electronic ContractingRules?
As mentioned above, UCITA's electronic contracting provisions
can be divided into three areas: (i) procedural rules; (ii) substantive
formation rules; and (iii) attribution rules.
48.

See U.C.I.T.A. § 104.

49.

See U.C.IT.A. § 104.
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ProceduralRules

Like UETA, UCITA includes the following general provisions
relevant to contracting electronically: (a) enforceability may not be
denied simply because a record or signature is electronic; (b) use
of electronic records and signatures is not required; 50 and (c) one
who uses an electronic agent is bound by the actions of the
electronic agent, even if no person was aware of the agent's
operations or results.5 1 UCITA also provides that in any transaction,
"a person may establish requirements regarding the type of
authentication or record acceptable to it."52
2.

Substantive FormationRules

UCITA's substantive formation rules contain the most important
and groundbreaking legal rules for electronic contracting. They
include validation of parties' choices of lawr and forum 4 in most
cases (which is particularly important in Internet commerce where
the location of the parties often is not known), provisions on the
manner in which an electronic contract may be formed,55 and the
manner in which the parties may establish the terms of an
electronic contract (including useful provisions on layered
contracting), specific rules limiting the enforceability of shrinkwrap
and clickwrap contracts,5 provisions governing access contracts, 57
and provisions limiting the ability of a licensor to exercise
electronic self help. 58
a.

Choice of Law and Forum

In general, designations of governing law and forum contained in
a contract are enforceable.5 9 This is consistent with the practice of
most lawyers and businesses, who routinely include choice of law
and forum clauses in their contracts. It also is consistent with case
law, which routinely enforces such choices in the absence of
50. See U.C.I.T.A.
51. See U.C.I.T.A.
52. See U.C.I.T.A.
53. See U.C.IT.A.
54. See U.C.I.T.A.
55. See U.C.I.T.A.
56. See U.C.I.T.A
57. See U.C.I.T.A.
58. See U.C.I.T.A.
59. See Medtronic
v. McDonnell Douglass

§ 107.
§ 107.
§ 107.
§ 109.
§ 110.
§§ 201-210.
§§ 208-09.
§§ 611, 617.
§ 816.
Inc. v. Janss, 729 F.2d 1395 (11th Cir. 1984); Northeast Data Sys., Inc.
Computer Sys. Co., 986 F.2d 607 (1st Cir. 1993).
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egregious circumstances. As discussed below, UCITAs provisions
relating to choice of law and forum clauses are particularly
important with respect to the growing area of e-commerce.
Relative to choice of law, UCITA generally permits parties to
choose the applicable law,6° with one important and appropriate
exception: in a consumer transaction, a choice of law will not be
enforceable to the extent that it varies a consumer protection rule
which cannot be varied by agreement under the law of the'
jurisdiction whose law would apply in the absence of the
agreement. 6' Thus, UCITA guarantees that with respect to such
matters, a state's consumer law will trump UCITA.62 If parties fail
to make a choice of law in their contract, UCITA provides default
rules that reflect the different types of transactions that are
covered by the statute. In "an access contract, or contract
providing for electronic delivery of a copy, the default rules provide
that [the contract] is governed by the law of the jurisdiction in
which the licensor is located when the agreement was entered
into."6 However, with respect to a "consumer contract that requires
delivery of a copy on a tangible medium [to the consumer,] [such a
contract is] governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the
copy is or should have been delivered."6 The default rules provide
that "in all other cases, the contract is governed by the law of the
jurisdiction having the most significant relationship to the
60. See U.C.I.T.A. § 109.
61. See U.C.I.T.A. § 109.
62. See U.C.IT.A. § 109. The UCITA Drafting Committee gave substantial consideration
to whether UCrrA should enact a substantive consumer protection rule in this regard rather
than deferring to the laws of each state. Ultimately, it was concluded that given the varying
approaches to consumer protection among the states, an approach which deferred to the
states was preferable.
63. See U.C.I.T.A. § 109(b)(1). Critics of UCITA routinely point to this provision as
evidence that UCITA is biased in favor of licensors. In fact, the Drafting Committee's
reasoning for the adoption of this provision had nothing to do with preferring one party over
the other, rather, consistent with its overall mandate, the Drafting Committee was attempting
to fashion a rule which would provide certainty. In the electronic world, it often is not clear
where a licensee is located. Although licensees who acquire software through a website
usually are asked to type in information stating where they are, there is no current method
to ensure that they tell the truth. Nodes can be "spoofed" to confuse the sender. It is not,
however, easy for a licensor to misrepresent its headquarters location. This is a matter of
legal record. It thus is understandable that the Drafting Committee, faced with selecting a
default jurisdiction for these types of contracts, opted for the choice that would provide
certainty.
64. See U.C.I.T.A. § 109(b)(2). The Drafting Committee's adoption of this provision is
further evidence of its overall decision to favor certainty in contracting. In these cases, it is
clear where the software was acquired, and thus it makes sense to favor the consumer.
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transaction.'6
With respect to issues regarding foreign jurisdictions, the default
rules provide that if the default jurisdiction is outside the U.S., "the
laws of that jurisdiction govern only if they provide substantially
similar protections and rights to the party not located in that
jurisdiction as are provided under [UCITA]."6 Otherwise, the laws
of the jurisdiction in the U.S. which has the most significant
relationship to the transaction governs.
UCITA also allows parties to choose their forum in their
contract, providing that these choices are not enforceable if they
are "unreasonable and unjust."67 This also follows modern case
law.6 If parties wish their forum choice to be exclusive, UCITA
requires the choice of forum clauses to state that expressly. Choice
of forum terms are particularly important in electronic commerce.
As noted in the Official Comments to Section 110, case law on the
issue of jurisdiction in the Internet demonstrates the difficulty in
knowing when doing business on the Internet will subject a party
to jurisdiction in all states and all countries. As indicated in the
Comment, this uncertainty has an impact on entities of all sizes
which do business on the Internet, but may more heavily impact
smaller businesses that may do more e-business than a traditional,
large corporation.
65. See U.C.I.T.A. § 109(b)(3). The Drafting Committee could have chosen to allow this
principle to govern access contracts as well, but that would have been, in the author's
opinion, a mistake. The default rules covering access contracts are sorely needed to bring
certainty to Internet contracting in computer information because in these types of
transactions, where the entire transaction can be accomplished electronically, there often is
no other touchstone. This can be contrasted with sales of goods over the Internet, where it
always will be possible to establish the physical places from where the goods were sent, and
to where the goods were sent. Where electronic computer information is the subject of the
transaction, however, it may not be possible to establish the situs of either end of the
transaction. Thus, if the parties do not make a valid choice of law in their contract, a court
would be in a quandary, applying traditional choice of law analysis, to determine the law
which would govern. The default rule provides a valuable and necessary guide for the court.
Further, as noted in the Official Comments to Section 109, this rule enhances certainty in a
transactional context where, because of the distribution system, an on-line vendor, large or
small, makes Internet access available to the entire world. The licensor's location does not
depend on the location of the computer that contains the information. Any other choice of
law rule would require that the information provider (small or large) comply with the law of
all states and all countries since it may not be clear, or even knowable, where the contract
is formed or the information sent.
66. See U.C.I.T.A. § 109(c).
67. See U.C.I.T.A. § 110(a).
68. See Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.LC., 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1999);
Evolution Online Systems, Inc., v. Koninklijke Nederlan N.V., 145 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1998).
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b. How Contracts Are Formed and How
Established

Terms Are

UCITA deals separately with forming a contract and with the
terms of that contract. UCIT~s formation rules are contained in
Sections 202 through 206. Section 202 sets forth the general
formation rules; Section 203 provides the general rules governing
offers and acceptances; Section 204 deals with offers and
acceptances that contain varying terms; Section 205 covers
conditional offers and acceptances; and Section 206 provides or the
formation of contracts by electronic agents.
Once it has been determined, by applying Sections 202 through
206, that a contract has been formed, Sections 208 through 210
determine the actual terms of the contract. Section 208 is the basic
provision which states that you adopt the terms of a record when
you agree to that record, subject to certain exceptions; Section 209
contains those exceptions as they relate to mass market contracts;
and Section 210 describes what terms are adopted when parties
form a contract by conduct.
This structure is useful in the world of paper contracting, but it
will be even more so as contracting moves more and more into the
electronic realm. It is derived in large measure from current UCC
Article 2, but several of the areas which have been prone to
confusion under Article 2 have been clarified. Moreover, it
recognizes the reality of modem contracting, particularly
electronically, which is that parties' contracts increasingly tend to
evolve, rather than to be made in a single piece of paper or event.
Computer Information transactions, in particular, typically are
ongoing relationships instead of one-time sales.
i.

Deciding Whether a Contract Has Been Formed

UCITA provides that a contract may be formed in any manner
sufficient to show agreement, including by offer and acceptance, by
conduct of the parties, or by operation of electronic agents that
recognize the existence of a contract.6 9 UCITA recognizes that even
if one or more terms are left open, the contract does not fail for
indefiniteness if the parties intended to make a contract and there
is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy. 0 If
69. See U.C..T.A. § 202, cmt. 2.
70. See U.C.I.T.A. § 202, cmt. 4. The comment clarifies that what is necessary in this
regard is the intent of the parties to be bound:
If that intent exists, enforceability does not require certainty on all terms, what the
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the parties intend to enter into a contract, therefore, the absence of
certain terms will not negate the agreement. This provision
provides the basis for the concept of layered contracting, which
recognizes that contracts do not arise in one single point in time,
but evolve over a period of time. Official Comment four to Section
202 states:
This subsection lays a foundation for the layered contracting
that typifies many areas of commerce and is recognized in
Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-204 (1998 Official Text),
as well as in the common law and practice of most states. The
foundation laid here is further developed in Sections 208, 209
and 305. Any concept that contracts arise at one single point
in time and that this single event defines all terms is not
consistent with commercial practice. Contracts are often
formed over a period of time, and terms are often developed
during performance, rather than before any performance
occurs. Rather than modifying an existing agreement, these are
part of the agreement itself. Treating later terms as a proposed
modification is appropriate only if the deal has, in commercial
understanding of both parties, been closed with no reason to
know new terms would be provided. If the parties did not
intend to be bound to any contract unless terms were agreed
to, subsection (e) gives guidance for unwinding the
71
relationship.
Comment four also clarifies that, in the time when terms are to be
proposed in a layered contract, it is not appropriate to apply
UCITA:s default rules. Doing so would presume that merely because
a term had not been proposed, the parties purposely omitted it and
had intended for the default rules to apply. Comment four confirms
that in layered contracting "the agreement is that there are no
terms on the undecided issues until they are made express by the
parties. Applying a default rule would be applying the rule despite
parties were to do, what obligations they assumed, what acts they agreed to perform
or what damages arise on breach. Rather, commercial standards can apply to these
questions, reflecting the fact that in many contracts terms are defined over time,
rather than on the occurrence of one specific event. Contract formation is a process,
rather than a single event. Being bound at one point subject to changes and further
agreement is a common circumstance in commerce. However, as a matter of fact, the
more terms the parties leave open, the less likely it is that they intended to be bound.
Id.
71.

See U.C.I.T.A. § 202, cmt. 4.
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contrary agreement, rather than when no such agreement exists."72
Finally, UCITA outlines certain instances where the parties are
not bound to a contract. For example, UCITA provides that "in the
absence of conduct or performance by both parties to the contrary,
a contract is not formed if there is a material disagreement about a
material term, including scope." 73 In addition, "if a term is to be
adopted by later agreement, and the parties intend not to be bound
unless the term is so adopted, a contract is not formed if the
parties ... [subsequently] do not agree to the term." 74
ii. Offer and Acceptance, Generally: Section 203
As under current UCC Article 2, UCITA provides that offer
invites acceptance in any reasonable manner, and that shipment or
the promise to ship is a proper means of acceptance unless the
offer provides otherwise. 75 For electronic messages and
performances, the timing of formation is based on the time that
the electronic acceptance is received or electronic performance is
received, if acceptance is by performance.7 6 This is appropriate in
the context of electronic commerce.
iii. Acceptance with Varying Terms: Section 204
Generally, UCITA provides that a definite and seasonable
acceptance operates as an acceptance even if it contains terms
which are different from the offer unless it materially alters the
offer.77 An acceptance materially alters an offer if it contains terms
that materially conflict with or vary the terms of the offer, or adds
material terms not contained in the offer.78 If an acceptance
materially alters an offer, then a contract is not formed unless all
other circumstances, including the conduct of the parties, establish
a contract. 79 Again, this combines the flexibility needed for
electronic contracting, with the certainty desired by parties.
72. See
73. See
74. See
75. See
76. See
performance.
77. See
78. See
79. See

U.C.I.T.A. § 202, cmt. 4.
U.C.I.T.A § 202(d).
U.C.I.T.A. § 202(e).
U.C.I.T.A. § 203.
U.C.I.T.A § 203. UCITA differentiates between receipt of notice and receipt of
See U.C.I.T.A. § 102(48).
U.C.I.T.A. § 204.
U.C.I.T.A. § 204(a).
U.C.I.TA § 204(c).

Duquesne Law Review
iv.

Vol. 38:209

Conditional Offers and Acceptances: Section 205

Offers or acceptances that because of the circumstances or the
language are conditioned upon agreement by the other party to the
terms of the offer or acceptance generally preclude formation of a
contract unless the other party agrees to the exact terms but if
both the offer and acceptance are contained in standard forms, and
one or both are conditioned on acceptance of their terms, then the
party requiring the agreement to its exact terms must act in a
manner consistent with those required terms, such as by refusing
to perform, refusing to permit performance or refusing to accept
the benefits of the contract until the proposed exact terms are
accepted.8° Again, this is a commonsense rule that reflects modem
contracting practices. You are not entitled to enforce your
condition unless you abide by it.
If a party agrees to a conditional offer effective under the terms
as outlined in the second part of the above paragraph, it adopts the
terms of that offer under Section 208 or 209, except terms which
conflict with any expressly agreed terms on price and quantity."1
v.

Offer and Acceptance; Electronic Agents; Section 206

Section 206 confirms that electronic agents (think: computers)
can form contracts with individuals and with other electronic
agents if they are used by the parties for that purpose, and if their
actions indicate that a contract exists.8 2 The terms of the contract,
like a contract formed solely by the actions of humans, are
determined under Section 208 or 209.13 UCITA also confirms in this
section that common law theories of mistake and fraud will and
should be applied to contracts created in this manner 4 A contract
is not created if an electronic agent's operations are induced by
fraud or mistake, such as if a party or its electronic agent
manipulate the programming or response of the other electronic
agent in a manner akin to fraud because the requisite assent cannot
have been given in such cases.85
Contracts between electronic agents and human beings create a
80. See U.C.I.T.A § 205.
81. See U.C.I.T.A. §§ 208-09.
82. See U.C.I.T.A. §§ 206(a)-(b).
83. See U.C.I.T.A § 206(c).
84. "Courts applying these concepts may refer to cases involving mistake or fraud
doctrine even though an electronic agent cannot actually be said to have been misled or
mistaken." See U.C.I.T.A. § 206, cmt. 3.
85. See U.C.I.T.A. § 206, cmt. 3.
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new group of questions. What should the legal rules be for the
interaction of computers and individuals, where the computer may
have most of the information, but the individual has free will and
the ability to bargain? UCITA generally answers these questions in
a way that will seem almost intuitive to most people, and certainly
is refreshing in its common sense approach. Without resorting to a
laundry list, UCITA provides guidance on the elements that ought
to be a part of such an interaction. Basically, what UCITA says is
that the electronic agent must be programmed to make contracts,
the individual must be free to refuse to make a contract, but that if
the individual takes actions that she has reason to know will cause
the electronic agent to provide the benefits of the contract, or
otherwise accept, then the contract is made. Statements by an
individual which the electronic agent is not programmed to react to
are not legally effective. 86
c.

Establishing the terms of a contract

Once a contract is formed, Sections 208 and 209 provide the
basis for establishing the contract's terms. Except as provided in
Section 209 (which contains certain protections for mass market
contracts) a party adopts the terms of a record, including a
standard form, if it agrees to the record.8 7 Adoption of certain
terms may occur after beginning performance or use if the parties
86. Official Comment number 4 to Section 206 provides useful examples of this, of
which one follows:
Officer dials the telephone information system using his company credit card. A
computerized voice states: "If you would like us to dial your number, press "1", there
will be an additional charge of $1.00. If you would like to dial yourself, press "2".
Officer states into the phone that the company will not pay the $1.00 additional
charge, but will pay $.50. Having stated these conditions, Officer strikes "1". The
computer dials the number, having located it in the database. User's "counter offer" is
ineffective. The charge to user's company includes the additional $1.00.
See U.C.I.T.A. § 206, cmt. 4.
87. See U.C.I.T.A. § 208(1). As noted in Official Comment number 2 to Section 208:
There is no difference between adopting terms of a customized record or of a
standard form. Standard forms are commonly used in commercial practice and
provide efficiencies for both parties. Treating them in law as less than other contracts
would put commercial law in conflict with commercial practice and reduce the
efficiencies. Standard forms will increasingly be not the province of only one party to
the deal. This section rejects decisions and the rule of Restatement (Second) of
Contracts Section 211(3) which hold that a term that is not unconscionable or
induced by fraud may be invalidated because a court holds after-the-fact that a party
could not have expected it to be in the contract. Absent unconscionability, fraud or
similar conduct, subject to Section 209, parties are bound the by terms of the
contractual records to which they assent.
See U.C.I.T.A. § 208, cmt. 2.
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had reason to know that their agreement would be represented in
whole or in part by a later record to be agreed but at the time
performance or use commenced there would be no opportunity to
review the record before performance or use began. If a party
adopts the terms of a record, the terms become part of the
contract without regard to a party's knowledge or understanding of
individual terms in the records, except for a term that is
unenforceable because it fails to satisfy another requirement of
UCITAA8
Section 208 (and Section 209 discussed below) must be read,
however, with an understanding of significant additional
protections established by Section 105 of UCITA for licensees
under both standard forms and mass market licenses.8 Section 105
provides that if a term of a contract violates a fundamental public
policy, the court may refuse to enforce the contract or limit
application of the term so as to avoid a result contrary to public
policy 0 The Comments to Section 105 recognize that the terms of
mass market licenses may not be available to the licensee prior to
the payment of the price and typically are not subject to affirmative
negotiations. In such circumstances, courts must be more vigilant
in assuring that limitations on use of the informational subject
matter of the license are not invalid under fundamental public
policy.91
d. Special Rules for Mass Market Licenses (Shrinkwrap and
Clickwrap Contracts): Section 209
UCITA provides guidelines for the enforceability of contract
terms in mass market licenses. 92 A party adopts the terms of a
88. See U.C.I.T.A. § 208(3).
89. See U.C.I.T.A § 105.
90. See U.C.I.T.A. § 105(b).
91. See U.C..T.A. § 105, cmt. 3.
92. UCITA defines a "mass-market license" as a "standard form used in a mass-market
transaction." U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(43). A "mass-market transaction" means a transaction that is:
(A) a consumer contract; or (B) any other transaction with an end-user licensee if. (i)
the transaction is for information or for informational rights directed to the general
public as a whole, including consumers, under substantially the same terms for the
same information; (ii) the licensee acquires the information or informational rights in
a retail transaction under terms and in a quantity consistent with an ordinary
transaction in a retail market; and (iii) the transaction is not- (I) a contract for
redistribution or for public performance or public display of a copyrighted work; (1) a
transaction in which the information is customized or otherwise specially prepared by
the licensor for the licensee, other than minor customization using a capability of the
information intended for that purpose; (I) a site license; (IV) or an access contract.
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mass market license only by "manifesting assent" (see below for
discussion of this concept) before or during the party's initial
performance or use of or access to the information. A term is not
part of the license if it is unconscionable or unenforceable under
Section 105(a) or (b), 93 or, subject to Section 301, if it conflicts
with terms to which the parties expressly agreed.
UCITA provides that non-negotiable contract terms for a
mass-market license that are presented after the price for the
license has been paid (for example, a shrinkwrap or certain
clickwrap licenses) are enforceable under UCITA only if the
licensee obtains certain rights that licensees do not have under
current law. UCITA states that if a licensee does not have an
opportunity to review the terms of a mass market license prior to
becoming obligated to pay, and does not agree to the license after
having that opportunity, the licensee is entitled to a'return under
Section 112, and to reimbursement of reasonable expenses of
return, compensation for reasonable and foreseeable costs of
restoring the licensee's information processing system to reverse
changes in the system caused by the installation, if the installation
occurs because information must be installed to enable review of
the license and the installation alters the system or information in
it but does not restore the system or information upon removal of
94
the installed information because of rejection of the license.
The UCITA Drafting Committee spent many years and dozens of
meetings debating what ought to be the proper approach for
shrinkwrap, and, as electronic delivery of software became more
prevalent, clickwrap licenses. (A shrinkwrap license is the printed
form license routinely found inside a box of software, or on the
screen when you boot up the software. A clickwrap license is the
license you see on your screen when you sign up to purchase new
software online. Typically, you do not see the license inside the
box, or on the boot up screen, until after you have paid for the
See U.C.I.T.A. § 102(a)(44).
93. These sections state:
(a) A provision of this [Act] which is preempted by federal law is unenforceable to
the extent of the preemption.
(b) If a term of a contract violates a fundamental public policy, the court may refuse

to enforce the contract, enforce the remainder of the contract without the
impermissible term, or limit the application of the impermissible term so as to avoid a
result contrary to public policy, in each case to the extent that the interest in
enforcement is clearly outweighed by a public policy against enforcement of the term.
See U.C..T.A. § 105(a) and (b).
94. See U.C.IT.A. § 112.
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software, the license says that you agree to it if you break open the
"shrinkwrap" or start to use the software. This form of license was
developed by software manufacturers 20 years ago as a method of
mass marketing software while protecting their valuable intellectual
property interests. Clickwrap licenses sometimes are seen before
payment, and sometimes after.) Some of UCITA:s opponents have
suggested that, under UCITA, for the first time these contracts will
be legally enforceable. In fact, these contracts have been upheld in
most courts across the country for years. 95
The UCITA Drafting Committee was faced with a difficult
decision: ban these types of contracts altogether, or place some
reasonable limitations on them. Given that shrinkwraps have been
the paradigm contract form in this industry for twenty years, with
relatively few problems or lawsuits, banning them outright would
have been irresponsible. Still, the Drafting Committee recognized
that protection was indicated in situations where parties,
particularly consumers and retail purchasers, are not able to review
the terms of the contract in advance. They considered many
alternatives, from prescribing required terms for shrinkwrap
licenses (which was rejected because, among other things, it was
thought to be too technologically inflexible and regulatory for a
commercial statute), to requiring that material terms be stated on
the outside of the software package (which was rejected because,
among other things, the materiality of many terms also would
change with technology, and there was a concern that unless the
specific laundry list of terms was stated in the Act, interpretation
would be problematic for the courts).
Ultimately, the drafting committee adopted an approach that was
developed out of a suggestion by the American Bar Association
Information Licensing Subcommittee. That approach, simply stated,
puts the shrinkwrap licensee in the same position as he would have
been in had he seen the terms of the contract before he made his
decision to purchase. The reasoning of the ABA Subcommittee was
that since the basic objection of many of the opponents was that
shrinkwrap licensees did not have the chance to review the terms
prior to payment, and since they might have decided not to
purchase if they had seen the terms, then the statute should try to
put them in that position legally, even if it could not do so
practically.
Thus, basically, UCITA does not make shrinkwrap contracts
95.

See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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enforceable; in fact, it makes them unenforceable unless they meet
certain standards, all of which are improvements on current
commercial practice. What are these standards? UCITA says that if
you do not see the terms of a contract until after you pay, then you
must have the absolute right to return the software for a full refund
if you don't like any of the terms of the contract, together with the
costs of return, AND if you have to install the software in order to
view the license and it somehow damages your computer, then you
must be paid for the damage to your computer as well. None of
this requires that there be any flaw in the software; you have the
right of cost-free return just because you do not like the terms of
the contract. The reasoning, again, is that if the terms are so
undesirable that you would have decided not to purchase the
software had you seen them in advance, then you should not be
required to keep the software and it should be easy for you to get
your money back. All of this is overlaid on the significant new
protections established by Section 105, which limits the ability of
licensors to include certain types of provisions in their standard
form contractsf 6 While this approach does not satisfy everyone, it
seemed to be the most fair and the most akin to current
commercial expectations out of the many alternatives considered.
e.

Terms when Contractformed by Conduct: Section 210

If a contract is formed by conduct, UCITA provides that a court
shall consider a list of factors to determine what terms are
included: (i) the terms and conditions to which the parties
expressly agreed; (ii) course of performance, course of dealing or
usage of trade; (iii) the nature of the parties' conduct; (iv) the
records exchanged; (v) the information or informational rights
involved; (vi) the supplementary terms of UCITA which apply and
all other relevant circumstances. 97
i.

Manifesting Assent

"Manifesting Assent" has many roles in contract law. Two of its
principal roles in UCITA are: (1) it is one way by which a party
indicates agreement to a contractual relationship; and (2) it is one
standard used to determine when a party adopts the terms of a
records as the terms of the contractual relationship. 98 As the
96. See U.C.I.T.A § 105.
97. See U.C.IT.A § 210(a).
98. See U.C.I.T.A. § 112, cmt. 1.
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comments point out, most often the same act will both indicate
agreement to a contractual relationship and indicate which terms of
a record are adopted as the terms of that relationship. Manifesting
Assent is intended to be particularly useful in electronic contracting
situations.
UCITA provides that one manifests assent to a record or term by,
after having had an opportunity to review the record or term or a
copy of it,99
(1) authenticating it;
(2) in the case of a person, engaging in conduct or making
statements that are intended, and which the person engaging
in the conduct or making the statements knows or has reason
to know that the other party may infer from such conduct or
statements that the person assents to the record or term;
(3) in the case of operations of an electronic agent,1°0 engaging
in operations that the circumstances clearly indicate constitute
acceptance.101
The authentication, statement or conduct must be attributable to
the person. 10 2
As the Comments indicate, the basic principle of manifesting
assent is that words are not the only means of indicating assent to
a contract, and that conduct can convey assent as clearly as
° This concept is present in UCC Article 2 and in the
words. m
Restatement. In UCITA, it is the perfect, flexible vehicle for the
demands of electronic commerce. UCITA sets forth overall
99. See U.C.I.T.A § 112. Official Comment number 8 to UCITA Section 112 states:
A manifestation of assent under this Act cannot occur unless there was an
opportunity to review the record or term to which the assent is directed. Common
law is not clear on this requirement, but it reflects simple fairness and codifies or
adapts concepts preventing procedural unconscionability. For a "person", an
opportunity to review requires that a record be made available in a manner that ought
For an
to call it to the attention of a reasonable person and permit review ...
electronic agent, an opportunity to review exists only if the record is one to which a
reasonably configured electronic agent could respond.
See U.C.I.T.A § 112, cmt. 8.
100. UCITA defines "electronic agents" to mean a computer program, or electronic or
other automated means, used by a person to initiate an action, or to respond to electronic
messages or performances, on the person's behalf without review or action by an individual
at the time of the action, or response to a message or performance. See U.C.I.T.A. § 102(27).
101. See U.C.I.T.A. § 112(a).
102. See U.C.LT.A. § 112. See infra for discussion of the importance of attribution to
the person.
103. See U.C.I.T.A. § 112, cmt. 2.
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standards which are necessary for a valid manifestation of assent,10 4
and then allows the parties to utilize the appropriate form for the
particular agreement involved. Conduct or operations manifesting
assent may be proved in any manner, including by showing that a
procedure existed whereby a party must have engaged in conduct
that manifested assent in order to proceed further with the use it
made of the information or informational rights (e.g., striking a key
to get to the next screen).105 Proof of assent depends on the
circumstances. There is a safe harbor provided. 1°6 Moreover, if
UCITA or other law requires assent to a specific term (such as with
respect to permitting a licensor to exercise electronic self help
under Section 816), then the manifestation of assent must relate
specifically to the term (e.g., this may require "clicking" specifically
on that term).
ii.

Attribution in Electronic Transactions

The Draft of UCITA that was submitted to the 1999 NCCUSL
Annual Conference contained important and groundbreaking
attribution rules. These included a provision which allowed parties
to agree that, if they agreed up front to use a commercially
reasonable attribution procedure, 10 7 then, if they used that
attribution procedure in their dealings with one another, and the
attribution procedure showed that a particular message came from
one of the parties, it would be in fact deemed to have come from
that party.1°8 Similarly, if the attribution procedure indicated the
content of a particular message, then that message would be
deemed to have had the content sent.1°9
Put into practical terms, here is the effect of such provisions.
Company A and Company B decide to undertake a series of
104. See U.C.I.TA. § 112.
105. See U.C.I.T.A. § 112(d).
106. See U.C.I.T.A. § 112(d). Section 112(d) states that "Proof of compliance with
subsection (a)(2) is sufficient if there is conduct that assents and subsequent conduct that
reaffirms assent by electronic means." Official Comment No. 12 to Section 112 makes it clear
that this encompasses "doubleclicking" or similar forms of duplicative consent procedures.
See U.C.I.T.A. § 112, cmt. 12.
107. Attribution Procedure means a procedure to verify that an electronic
authentication, display, message, record or performance is that of a particular person or to
detect changes or errors in informational. The term includes a procedure that requires the
use of algorithms or other codes, identifying words or numbers, encryption, or callback or
other acknowledgment.
108. Draft of UCITA submitted to the 1999 NCCUSL Annual Conference, Section 215.
109. Draft of UCITA submitted to the 1999 NCCUSL Annual Meeting, Section 216.
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electronic transactions. Company A wants to know that the
messages which seem to come from Company B actually do come
from Company B, and that what they say is what Company B in
fact wrote. Company B wants to know the same about the
messages that come from Company A. From a practical standpoint,
Company A and B want to know these things because they are
dealing with each other in a series of transactions and each needs
to be able to rely at each step on what the other has done. The
most common way that parties solve this problem now is to agree
up front to use a particular attribution procedure. These can take
many forms, passwords, complex algorithms, etc. The point is that
whatever form of security procedure is chosen, it must be
commercially reasonable in light of the transaction being done. 110
For example, an eight digit password might be thought to be
commercially reasonable for access to a commonly available
commercial database, but not for the transfer of millions of dollars
electronically. Going back to the example, Company A and B
decide to use particular attribution procedures. Neither can send or
view information to or from the other without using the agreed
upon attribution procedure. If Company A uses the attribution
procedure, and it indicates that the message came from Company
B, and that the content of the message is what Company B sent,
then Company A is entitled to rely on that and Company B is
bound by it.. If, however, and this is an important point, Company
B can demonstrate that it did not send the message, or that the
content Company A received is not what Company B sent, then
Company B is not bound by it.
Why should the law include these types of provisions? Because
they will promote certainty in electronic contracting, chill frivolous
litigation by remorseful parties who wish they hadn't undertaken a
particular transaction and now are looking for a way out, and
encourage parties to use appropriate, commercially reasonable
110. Section 214 of the Draft of UCITA which was submitted to the 1999 NCCUSL
Annual Meeting stated:
The commercial reasonableness of an attribution procedure is determined by the
court. In makng this determination, the following rules apply:
(1) An attribution procedure established by statute or regulation is commercially
reasonable for transactions within the coverage of the statute or regulation;
(2) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (1) commercial reasonableness is
determined in light of the purposes of the procedure and the commercial
circumstances at the time the parties agree to or adopt the procedure.
(3) A commercially reasonable attribution procedure may use any security device
or method that is reasonable under the circumstances.
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security procedures by rewarding them when they do.
Unfortunately, these provisions were not well understood at the
NCCUSL Annual Meeting (not surprisingly, given the magnitude of
information digested by the Commissioners that week) and the
Conference ultimately voted not to include them in the final UCITA
by a narrow vote of 63 to 60.111 Since then, provisions similar to
these have been considered in another setting: the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania. As noted above, Pennsylvania considered
provisions similar to these when they deliberating the enactment of
UETA in Pennsylvania in the fall of 1999. It was decided that these
provisions had significant value for the reasons discussed herein,
and ultimately they were included in Pennsylvania's Electronic
Transactions Act. This decision already has resulted in the
attraction of new electronic commerce companies to Pennsylvania,
and it seems likely that other states may follow suit, either as they
consider UETA or UCITA.
Without such provisions, the current UCITA includes a section
that discusses when an electronic message is attributed to a
particular person. UCITA Section 213 provides that "a party relying
on attribution of an electronic authentication, display, message,
record, or performance to another person has the burden of
establishing attribution."" 2 A "burden of establishing" means "the
burden of persuading the trier of fact that the existence of a fact is
more probably than its non-existence."113 However, as discussed
above, the draft versions of UCITA contained a much more
comprehensive attribution provision, which, inter alia, provided
means by which the "burden of establishing" could be met and
included a requirement that an attribution procedure be
commercially reasonable. UCITA now generally states that the act
of a person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of
4
the efficacy of an attribution procedure."
UCITA also contains a section that provides that if an attribution
procedure exists to detect errors or changes in an electronic
authentication, display, message, record, or performance, and one
party conformed to the procedure and the other party did not, and
the nonconforming party would have detected the change or error
had that party also conformed, the conforming party may avoid the
111.
112.
113.
114.

See
See
See
See

Minutes of 1999 NCCUSL Annual Conference.
U.C.I.T.A. § 213.
U.C.I.T.A. § 213, comments.
U.C.I.T.A. § 213(b).
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effect of the error or change.1 5 This section is useful as far as it
goes, but it would have been much more useful if it had
established an affirmative basis upon which parties could rely on
the content of an electronic message (as did the prior version of
UCITA) rather than just an ability to avoid the error if a party did
not conform. The latter is obvious and intuitive, and it seems
unlikely that any court would have trouble reaching that
conclusion. The former would have provided guidance and
certainty to courts and contracting parties.
f.

Electronic Error-ConsumerDefenses

UCITA provides special rules for electronic errors in consumer
transactions. In an automated transaction, a' consumer is not bound
by an electronic message that the consumer did not intend and
which was caused by an electronic error if the consumer promptly
on the earlier of learning of the error notifies the other party of the
error; and delivers all copies of any information it receives to the
other party or delivers or destroys all copies pursuant to
reasonable instructions received from the other party; and has not
used or received a benefit from the information or caused the
information or benefit to be made available to a third party.116
i.

Access Contracts

What should be the legal role and liability of Internet Access
Providers? State, federal and international courts have been
attempting to sort this out for the past several years. UCITA
provides significant clarity in this regard. In every potentially
relevant provision, UCITA addresses the effect on the access
7
provider, whether in the black letter law or a Comment." It
describes reasonable default rules that reflect current commercial
expectations and guides parties who are attempting to contract
with or through such providers. UCITAs default rules include the
following provisions which address the obligations of access
providers under access contracts (e.g., a contract to electronically
gain access to the information processing system of another-a
common example would be a subscriber's contract with America
115. See U.C.IT.A. § 213 (d).
116. See U.C.I.T.A. § 214.
117. A partial list of the sections that affect and/or specifically consider the concerns
of access providers: 102, 105, 107, 108, 109, 112, 113, 202, 203, 206, 208, 209, 211, 212, 213,
214, 215, 304, 307,'308, 404, 406, 602, 611, 617 and 814.
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1. Access must be made available at times and in a manner
either conforming to the express terms of the agreement or, if
there are no such terms, then in a manner reasonable for the
particular type of contract in light of ordinary standards of the
18
business or industry
2. A change in the content of the information is only a breach
of contract if the change conflicts with an express term of the
agreement.119
3. Unless subject to a contractual restriction, information
obtained by the licensee is free of any use restriction other
than a restriction resulting from the informational rights of
another. 120
4. If the access contract provides access over time, the
licensee's access rights are as modified and made
121
commercially available by the licensor during that time.
5. If the access contract allows the licensee access at times of
its own choosing, an occasional failure to have access
available during those times is not a breach of contract if it is:
a. consistent with ordinary standard of the business, trade
or industry for the particular type of contract; or
b. caused by scheduled downtime, reasonable needs for
maintenance, reasonable periods of equipment, software
or communications failure, or events reasonably beyond
the licensor's control and the licensor exercises
efforts
under the
reasonable
commercially
22
circumstances. 1
UCITA also addresses the sensitive issue of when access
providers may cut off access. The decision to cut off access to a
subscriber, and consequently a stream of revenue of that
subscriber, is a decision not taken lightly by an access provider.
Indeed, in a perfect world, the access provider would prefer never
to have to cut off a subscriber. At times, however, this becomes
necessary, particularly in cases where the subscriber is violating
the terms of the Service or taking actions which would harm third
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See
See
See
See
See

U.C.IT.A.
U.C.IT.A.
U.C.I.T.A.
U.C.I.T.A.
U.C.IT.A.

§
§
§
§
§

611(a)(4).
611(a)(2).
611(a)(3).
611(a)(1).
611(b).
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parties, such as by circulating child pornography, or where
circulation of other material violates the law of a jurisdiction in
which the Service can be accessed. At those times, the access
provider needs to be able to cut off service immediately. Sections
617 and 814 provide this right to the access provider. Under Section
617(b), an access contract may be terminated without giving notice.
However, except on the happening of an agreed event, termination
requires giving reasonable notice to the licensee if the access
contract pertains to information owned and provided by the
licensee to the licensor. 123 This protects licensees in database
contracts. Section 814 gives the access provider the right to
discontinue access "on material breach of an access contract or if
124
the agreement so provides."
Moreover, UCITA makes clear that an access provider does not
manifest assent to a contractual relationship simply by their
provision of access services. 125 This issue clarifies an important
concern of access providers: whether they are somehow liable for,
or in a contractual relationship with those who utilize their service
to provide and exchange information to and with other users of
their service.
Finally, UCITA preserves current law for published informational
content. 126 As noted in Official Comment number 8 to Section 402,
it does not change express warranty rules for published
informational content, but does not preclude the imposition of any
obligation under other law or the creation of an express
contractual obligation. 27 UCITA also clarifies the relationship
between certain implied warranties and access providers. UCITA
makes it clear that the implied warranty of merchantability does
123. See U.C.I.T.A. § 617(b).
124. See U.C.I.T.A. § 814. Section 814 must be distinguished from Section 816, which
provides severe restrictions on the ability of licensors to exercise electronic self help to
disable a licensee's ability to use computer information. Section 816 will apply in the more
traditional business software setting, but not to access contracts.
125. See U.C.I.T.A- § 112, cmt. 7.
126. "Published informational content" means "informational content prepared for or
made available to recipients generally, or to a class or recipients, in substantially the same
form." See U.C.I.T.A. § 102(51). The term does not include informational content that is:
(A) customized for a particular recipient by one or more individuals acting as or on
behalf of the licensor, using judgment or expertise; or
(B) provided in a special relationship of reliance between the provider and the
recipient.
See U.C.I.T.A § 102(51).
127. See Joel R. Wolfson, Express Warranties and Published Informational Content
under Article 2B: Does the Shoe Fit?, 16 J. MARSHALL J. OF COMPUTER AND INFO. L 384 (1997).
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not apply to informational content, another important issue for
access providers.
There is created by UCITA Section 404 a separate implied
warranty for informational content which provides that a merchant
in a special relationship of reliance with a licensee collects,
complies, processes, provides or transmits informational content
warrants to that licensee that there is no inaccuracy in the
informational content caused by the merchant's failure to perform
with reasonable care. 128 This warranty does not arise, however, for
a person that acts as a conduit, or provides no more than editorial
services in collecting, compiling, distributing, processing, providing
or transmitting informational content that under the circumstances
can be identified as that of a third person. 129 This is an important
clarification for access providers who have repeatedly been the
subject of actions attempting to hold them liable for content
provided by third parties and merely distributed over their
networks.
ii.

Electronic Self-Help

One of the most controversial provisions of UCITA has been
Section 816, which limits the rights of licensors to exercise
electronic self help. At the outset, it must be noted that UCITA
does not create the right of electronic self help; it limits it.130
Under current law, self help generally can be exercised in a variety
of transactions, as long as there is no breach of the peace. In this
area, UCITA's drafters were faced with a difficult choice: (1) ban
self-help entirely; (2) say nothing about self help and thus implicitly
approve its unfettered use; or (3) put reasonable restraints on the
its use. They chose option three because they thought there were
good reasons for the use of electronic self help to not be entirely
unchecked, yet, they also felt that there was not anything so
different about computer information transactions that a complete
reversal of existing law was warranted.
UCITAs drafters came up with the following restraints, all of
which must be met before a licensor may exercise electronic
31
self-help:'
(1) There must be a material breach of the contract (in
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other words, the Licensor cannot use electronic self-help
in minor disputes)
The software license agreement (or other contract) must
contain a separate term which specifically authorizes
the Licensor to use electronic self help, and the
Licensee must separately agree to that term-so there is
no way that such a term could be "slipped by" an
unwitting licensee. If the licensee does not agree to the
term, the licensor cannot lawfully exercise electronic
self help.
The Licensor must provide 15 days advance notice
before exercising electronic self-help. (This alone would
enable most licensees to move any mission critical
software out of harm's way). The notice must include
both a description of the alleged breach and the name
and contact information of someone at the Licensor's
office that the Licensee can contact to object to the use
of electronic self-help. Moreover, the Agreement must
state exactly to whom this notice must be sent, so there
is no danger that the wrong person at a company would
receive the notice and not know what to do about it.
No Licensor can use electronic self help if doing so
would be likely to result in physical harm to any person
or property (other than the licensed information) or to
the public interest, no matter what the contract says.
Thus, using electronic self help being used to shut
down the air traffic control system, or patient care
systems in hospitals, or the like, (as is often stated in
popular press accounts of UCITA) simply is not
permitted by UCITA.
If a Licensor uses electronic self help wrongly, or
without providing the required notice, UCITA expressly
states that the Licensor is liable for steep damages,
including consequential damages. UCITA does not
permit these to be waived up front-thus the Licensor
can do nothing to escape them.
UCITA gives licensees the right to seek expedited relief
in court to stop the use of electronic self help.
UCITA expressly states that licensees may include in
contracts a term which prohibits the use of self help by
the licensee.
UCITA does not permit these restrictions on the licensor
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to be varied by agreement; in other words, large
licensors may not use their superior bargaining leverage
to force licensees to give up the benefit of these
132
provisions.

Very few licensees would have the commercial leverage to
negotiate all of these protections into their software license
agreements-and if they could, they likely Would have to give up
significant other concessions to get them. UCITA does this work
for them. Furthermore, UCITA eliminates the possibility that
electronic self-help may be exercised against licensees who are not
particularly sophisticated in the negotiation of computer
information transactions, and who thus may not know to ask for
protection against electronic self help. By requiring the contract to
contain a term permitting it before it can be used, UCITA ensures
that licensors must inform their licensees about the possibility, and
secure their agreement up front. In general, the restrictions are so
heavy and the potential liability so great, that it is unlikely that
many licensors will feel comfortable using electronic self help after
UCITA is passed. These provisions create a substantial new benefit
for licensees, and for innocent third parties.
III.

APPLICATION OF

UETA AND UCITA RULES

TO THE HYPOTHETICALS

A purchasing agent for a national building contractorwants to
save time and money by contracting over the Internet for the
company's requirements for nails and other fasteners. She enters
into an electronic contract with the Internet vendor to supply the
company's requirementsfor three years.
Fortunately for this purchasing agent, UETA makes her
electronic contract as valid as a paper one, thus allowing her
to validly contract electronically for a period of time that in
most jurisdictions would require a signed writing.
An entrepreneur sets, up a website to match job seekers with
companies seeking their services. Using Internet technology, all of
the necessary "paperwork" can now be done electronically,
resulting in significant savings and time-until the entrepreneur
discovers that certain disclosures required under the federal Fair
Credit Reporting Act are not authorized to be made electronically.
UETA makes enforceable all of the entrepreneur's contracts
132.
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with jobseekers and employers. It may not affect the ability to
make valid electronic disclosures under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, but at least provides a legal basis to assert that
disclosures made electronically are as valid as those made on
paper.
A consumer attempts to download new software from the
vendor's website. During the downloading process, there is a small
hyperlink notice "Legal terms and conditions: Please read." The
consumer, eager to get the software, decides to finish downloading
and then go back and read the legal terms and conditions. When
she returns to find the link, however, it is gone. When she receives
the bill for the software she ordered, she sees that she has been
chargedfor eleven copies, not one, and realizes that she must have
pressed the "1" key twice by mistake when ordering.
UCITA protects the consumer in this instance by maling it
clear that the website's process for providing that consumer
with an opportunity to review the terms and conditions of the
license and then to obtain the consumer's assent to the terms
thereof are not sufficient to bind the consumer. Further,
UCITA contains a provision which expressly protects
consumers who make mistakes in electronic ordering. UCITA
also serves the vendor, however, by setting forth procedures
which can be easily adopted by any vendor, and which, when
followed, will result in enforceable electronic contracts.
A company emails a software manufacturer about acquiring a
new business application. The manufacturer responds with its
standard terms and conditions by email, and the company emails
back its order, substituting its standard terms and conditions for
those submitted by the manufacturer. The manufacturer emails
back a response stating that it will not ship unless its terms are
accepted by the buyer. The company emails back rejecting this
proposal, but there's an Internet glitch that day, the email never
makes it to the manufacturer and the manufacturer ships.
UCIT~s thoughtful approach to the "battle of the forms" in
cases where the Internet is the battlefield, gives all concerned
the ability to analyze their contracting procedures to be
certain that they will not unwittingly agree to terms and
conditions.

2000

Survey of UETA and UCITA

253

CONCLUSION

As UCC Article Two has done for transactions in goods, UETA
and UCITA provide guidance to parties, practitioners, and courts
alike as to how electronic transactions should be structured and
interpreted. Without UETA and UCITA, the promise of the Internet
to transform the way we do business cannot be fully realized. With
them, this promise can be achieved in a manner that considers the
interests of all contracting parties, allows them the freedom in
most cases to contract as they see fit, and provides protection
where it is most needed.

